Protection of individual privacy is a common concern when releasing and sharing data and information. Differential privacy (DP) formalizes privacy in mathematical terms without making assumptions about the background knowledge of data intruders and thus provides a robust concept for privacy protection. Practical applications of DP involve development of differentially private mechanisms to generate sanitized results without compromising individual privacy at a pre-specified privacy budget. Differentially private mechanisms make the most sense for sanitizing bounded data in general from the data utility perspective. In this paper, we define noninformative and informative bounding procedures in sanitization of bounded data, depending on whether a bounding procedure itself leaks original information or not. We introduce differentially private truncated and boundary inflated truncated (BIT) mechanisms with bounding constraints, and apply them in the framework of the Laplace mechanism. The impacts of the two noninformative bounding procedures on the accuracy and statistical validity of sanitized results are evaluated both theoretically and empirically, in terms of bias and consistency relative to their original values and to the underlying true parameters when the statistics are estimators of some parameters.
Introduction
Protection of individual privacy is always a concern when releasing and sharing data and information. A data release mechanism aims to provide useful information to the public without compromising individual privacy. Differential privacy (DP) is a concept developed by theoretical computer scientists (Dwork et al., 2006b; Dwork, 2008 Dwork, , 2011 that has gained great popularity in recent years. DP formalizes privacy in mathematical terms without making assumptions about the background knowledge of data intruders and thus provides a robust concept for privacy protection. Practical applications of DP involve development of differentially private mechanisms, also referred to as sanitizers, through which original results are processed and converted to results that do not reveal individual information at a pre-specified privacy budget. There are general differentially private mechanisms such as the Laplace mechanism (Dwork et al., 2006b) , the Exponential mechanism McSherry, 2009) , and more recently, the staircase mechanism (Geng et al., 2015) and the generalized Gaussian mechanism (Liu, 2016a) ; there are also mechanisms targeting specifically at certain statistical queries and analyses such as contingency tables (Barak et al., 2007) , robust and efficient point estimators (Dwork and Smith, 2010; Dwork, 2011) , principle components (Chaudhuri et al., 2012) , data mining, machine learning techniques, and big data analytics in multimedia, social networks, biometrics and localization (Blum et al., 2008; Kasiviswanathan et al., 2011; Mohammed et al., 2011; Choromanska et al., 2016; Lin et al., 2016; Zhou et al., 2016; Sadhya and Singh, 2016; Li et al., 2016) , linear and penalized regression (Chaudhuri et al., 2011; Kifer et al., 2012) , χ 2 test in genome-wide association studies (Yu et al., 2014) , and Bayesian inferences of probabilistic graphical models (Zhang et al., 2015) , among others. The Laplace and Exponential mechanisms also serves as the basis for the adaptive mechanisms for sanitizing multiple correlated query case such as the multiplicative weighting mechanism (Hardt et al., 2012) and the median mechanism (Roth and Roughgarden, 2010) .
In the context of DP, it is often assumed that data and statistics (query results) are bounded globally. The employment of "global" bounds rather than data-specific "local" bounds is one of the reasons underlying the robustness of the DP model against the worst-case privacy attack. However, the robustness could come with a price at data utility -more than necessary noise might be added to a data set to cover the globally worst case privacy attack. In the most extreme case, it is meaningless to apply DP to globally unbounded domains. For example, suppose the statistic is the sample meanx of a continuous variable x in a data set. The global range of x (independent of the data) is denoted by R, and the l 1 global sensitivity (GS) of the sample mean is R/n (see online supplementary materials). If the Laplace mechanism is applied to sanitizex, the scale parameter of the associated Laplace distribution is exponentially proportional to the l 1 GS of the sample mean. As R increases, the noise added tox via the Laplace mechanism gets larger (even if the local bounds of the data set per se remain unchanged). In the extreme case, if x is globally unbounded, that is, R = ∞, the scale parameter of the Laplace distribution is also ∞, and the sanitized results from the Laplace mechanism are meaningless and nothing more than a random number from the real line. Realizing the potential limitations of the GS in the sanitization of some data sets, researchers have developed alternative concepts to GS such as the smooth sensitivity and local senility (Nissim et al., 2007; Mcsherry, 2016) that allow the added noised be tuned to specific data sets without leaking original information; yet GS is still the predominantly used definition of sensitivity when it comes to the application of differentially private mechanisms in real life.
Real-life data in general support the assumption of data being bounded, making the applications of sanitization algorithms that rely on data boundedness feasible in practice. Some statistics are naturally bounded, such as proportions. Categorical attributes can be coded with binary indicators thus can be made "bounded" as well. Though numerical attributes might be modelled by distributions with unbounded domains, the distributional assumptions are in many cases only approximate and the probabilities taking out-of-bounds values are small enough to be ignorable under these distributional assumptions. For example, it is safe to say human height is bounded within (0, 300)cm. Though it is often modelled by Gaussian distributions with an support of [−∞, ∞], Pr(height < 0 or height > 300) ≈ 0 under the Gaussian assumption. As another example, the number of car accidents per day in a city is bounded within [0, c] , where c, the maximum possible car accidents, is a finite number. Though it is often modelled by Poisson distributions with unbounded support [0, 1, 2, . . .), Pr(number of per-day accidents in that city > c) ≈ 0 with the assumed Poisson distributions. If attributes in a data set is bounded, the associated statistics are in general also bounded.
There are several approaches when it comes to handling bounded sanitized data. In some cases, bounding conditions are ignored and out-of-bounds sanitized results (produced by mechanisms with unbounded outcome domains) are released. We don't recommend this approach since out-of-bounds values carry no practical meaning and baffle data users. A better approach is to applying mechanisms that are mindful of and taking into account the bounding constraints, by either allowing outcome domains to be pre-defined, integrating the bounding conditions during sanitization, or post-hoc legitimizing the out-of-bounds sanitized results before release. Barak et al. (2007) employed linear programming (and the Fourier transformation) to obtain a nonnegative and consistent sanitized contingency table (counts in a contingency table are bounded by 0 on the life side). Li et al. (2015) investigated an extension to the matrix mechanism they proposed that incorporates nonnegativity constraints when realizing count queries. In this paper, we take a closer and more systematic look at the bounding constraints in the application of differentially private mechanisms and formalizes the definitions. We define noninformative bounding and informative bounding, depending on whether the bounding per se leaks original information or not. We introduce two bounding procedures (truncation and boundary inflated truncation/BIT) in general settings and demonstrate their applications in the context of the Laplace mechanism. On the premise that DP is satisfied at a given privacy budget, we then assess the effect of bounding on the accuracy and utility of sanitized results both theoretically and empirically. In fact, the BIT procedure might be more often than people realize in practice Li et al. (2015) ; Chen et al. (2015) due to its simplicity. Though there seems to be a general consensus that the BIT procedures might lead to deviation of the sanitized results from the original, there is little work in exploring and quantifying the degree of the deviation. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first work that examines the effects of data boundedness on the utility and accuracy of sanitized results in DP.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 overviews the concepts of DP and some general differentially private mechanisms. Section 3 introduces the truncation and BIT procedures, noninformative and informative bounding. Section 4 investigates the impact of noninformative bounding procedures on the utility of sanitized results in terms of unbiasedness and consistency. Section 5 illustrates the applications of noninformative truncation and BIT Laplace mechanisms and examines the statistical properties of the sanitized results in two simulation studies. The paper concludes in 6 with some final remarks and plans for future works.
Preliminaries
We provide a brief overview on the key concepts in the framework of DP. The concept of DP itself was first proposed in Dwork (2006) and formulated in Dwork et al. (2006b) . Definition 1. A sanitization/perturbation algorithm R is -differentially private if for all data sets (x, x ) that is δ(x, x ) = 1 and all possible result subset Q to a query q,
δ(x, x ) = 1 denotes that data x differs from x by only one individual, and > 0 is the privacy budget parameter. Query q is a function operated on a data set, which is used exchangeably with statistic s in this discussion (s is also a function on a data set frequently used in statistics). Eq. (1) states that the probabilities of obtaining the same query result from x and x after the sanitization are about the same -the ratio between the two probabilities is bounded within (e − , e ) -a neighborhood around 1. The smaller is, the more similar the two probabilities are. DP guarantees individual privacy protection at a given since the chance a participant in the data set will be identified based on query results sanitized via R is very low given that the query results are about the same with or without that individual in the data set. DP provides a robust and powerful model against privacy attacks in the sense that it does not make assumptions on the background knowledge or the behavior on data intruders. In addition to -DP in Definition 1, there are softer versions of DP, among which ( , δ)-DP (Dwork et al., 2006a) , ( , δ)-probabilistic DP (pDP) (Machanavajjhala et al., 2008) , and ( , δ) random DP (rDP) (Hall et al., 2012) are the best known. In ( , δ)-DP, Pr(R(q(x)) ∈ Q) ≤ e Pr(R(q(x)) ∈ Q) + δ, where δ is a negligible number that relates to the size of the protected data. ( , δ)-DP reduces to -DP when δ = 0. A sanitization algorithm satisfies ( , δ)-pDP if the probability of generating an output belonging to the disclosure set is bounded below δ, where the disclosure set contains all the possible outputs that leak information for a given privacy tolerance . The ( , δ)-rDP is also a probabilistic relaxation of DP; but it differs from ( , δ)-pDP in that the relaxation takes the probability with respect to the generation of the data in ( , δ)-rDP while it is with respect to the randomized algorithm in ( , δ)-pDP. There are two commonly used sanitizers to release a query result with -DP: the Laplace mechanism (Dwork et al., 2006b ) and the Exponential mechanism . These two mechanisms are not query-specific, and can serve as basis and building blocks for queryspecific differentially private mechanisms or adaptive mechanisms (Section 1). The generalized Gaussian mechanism (GGM) is a recent generalization of the Laplace mechanism (Liu, 2016a) that can be used to achieving ( , δ)-pDP when the order p of the GGM is ≥ 2. The GGM reduces to the Laplace mechanism and the Gaussian mechanism when the order p is 1 and 2, respectively. We provide a brief review of the Laplace mechanism, the Exponential mechanism, and the GGM, respectively in what follows. We start with the l p global sensitivity of statistics s (Liu, 2016a) , on which the Laplace mechanism, the Gaussian mechanism and the GGM are based.
Definition 2. For all pairs of data sets (x, x ) that are δ(x, x ) = 1, the l p global sensitivity (GS) (p > 0) of statistics s r×1 is
δ p is the maximum possible difference in s between two data sets x, x with δ(x, x ) = 1. The sensitivity is "global" since it is defined for all possible data sets and all possible ways of these two data sets differing by one record. The larger the GS is for s, the larger the disclosure risk is from releasing the original s, and the more perturbation is needed for s to offset the large sensitivity. When r = 1 (s is s scalar), δ p remains the same regardless of p. In the case of multi-dimensional s (r > 1), δ 1 is the easiest to calculate among all p > 0, which is r i=1 δ i , where δ i is the GS of the i th element in s. The l p -GS is an extension of the l 1 -GS δ 1 = max Dwork et al. (2006b) .
Definition 3. In the Laplace mechanism of -DP, sanitized s * is generated as in s * r×1 = s r×1 + e r×1 , where e comprises r independent draws from Laplace distribution Lap 0, δ 1 −1 , where δ 1 is the l 1 GS of s.
The variance of the Laplace distribution in Definition 3 is 2 δ 1 −1 2 , implying that the larger δ 1 is or the smaller privacy budget is, the more spread out the distribution of sanitized s * is. On the other hand, once and δ 1 are given, s * closer to s in terms of the l 1 distance has a higher probability being released, implying the Laplace mechanism also promotes information preservation while maintaining -DP. In the case of a multi-dimensional s (r > 1), the noise term added to each element in s is sampled from the same distribution per Definition 3, regardless of how different these statistics and their respective GS are. This is referred to as the conjoint sanitization, as apposed to the individual sanitization, where each element is sanitized via an individualized Laplace distribution. Interested readers can refer to Liu (2016b) for more discussions on the conjoint sanitization and the individual sanitization.
The Exponential mechanism of -DP is based on a utility scoring function of all possible outputs to a query and its sensitivity. The probability of returning a particular query result s * is exponentially proportional to its utility score (how useful the result it).
Definition 4. Denote by u(s * |x) the utility score of output s * given data x, S is the set containing all possible outputs s * , and δ u = max
|u(s * |x) − u(s * |x )| is the maximum change in score u between two data sets x and x with δ(x, x ) = 1. The Exponential mechanism of -DP generates s * from distribution exp u(s * |x) 2δu
if S is discrete, and exp u(s * |x) 2δu
if S is continuous. (2) Definition 5. For integer p ≥ 2, the p-th ordered generalized Gaussian mechanism (GGM) sanitizes s with ( , δ)-pDP by drawing sanitized s * from the GG distribution
where b satisfies Pr (
,k , and δ 1,k is the l 1 -GS of s k and δ p is the l p -GS of s.
The GGM reduces to the Laplace mechanism of -DP when p = 1 and δ = 0, and to the Gaussian mechanism of ( , δ)-pDP when p = 2 that generates sanitized s * k from N(s k , σ 2 = b 2 /2) for k = 1, . . . , r. When s is a scalar, there exists an analytical lower bound on σ that satisfies ( , δ)-pDP, which is σ ≥ (2 ) −1 δ 1 (Φ −1 (δ/2)) 2 + 2 − Φ −1 (δ/2) ; when s is multidimensional, numerical approaches might be applied to obtain a lower bound on σ (Liu, 2016a) .
The Exponential mechanism can be used to sanitize both categorical and numerical outcomes. The Exponential mechanism relates to the GGM (Liu, 2016a) if the utility score in the former is formulated as similarity between s * and s quantified as the negative l p norm in the case of numerical outcomes . The outcome domain S is prespecified in the Exponential mechanism, thus can be used to sanitized bounded results directly by sampling from the distribution in Eq (2). The GGM (including the Laplace and Gaussian mechanisms) is mainly used for sanitization of numerical outcomes. It produces unbound sanitized results on the real line (−∞, ∞). As such, some bounding procedures will need to be placed before the GGM is applied to bounded data and statistics. It is important to ensure that either the extra bounding step does not leak original information or if it does, the total privacy budget incurred by sanitization and bounding together does not exceed the pre-set budget.
Bounding of Statistics
Definition 6. A bounding procedure is noninformative and data independent (or data invariant) if application of the procedure does not reveal additional information of the original data set. A bounding procedure that leaks information of the original data is referred to as an informative and data dependent procedure.
If a noninformative bounding procedure is applied to bound sanitized results, then we can spend all privacy budget on sanitization, with our mind at ease that the actual total privacy cost is kept at . If a bounding procedure is informative, then the privacy costs from the sanitization and bounding procedures should sum up to be ≤ , which can be difficult to assess and validate if the actual privacy cost of the bounding procedure is not easy to quantify. We define two simple noninformative bounding procedures in the context of Laplace mechanism; the extension of both procedures to other mechanisms are straightforward.
Definition 7. Denote the bounded statistics by s r×1 = (s 1 , . . . , s r ) ∈ [c 10 , c 11 ] × · · · × [c r0 , c r1 ], the privacy budget by , the l 1 -GS of s by δ 1 , and λ = δ 1 −1 a). The noninformative truncated Laplace mechanism of -DP sanitizes s directly via the truncated Laplace distribution
where s i is the i-th element of s, and (c i0 , c i1 ) are the data-invariant bounds for s i .
b). The noninformative boundary-inflated-truncated (BIT) Laplace mechanism of -DP sanitizes
The truncation and BIT procedure can be either informative or non-informative, depending on whether the bounds [c 10 , c 11 ]×· · ·×[c r0 , c r1 ] at which truncation or BIT occur are data invariant or not. The truncated Laplace mechanism can also be realized via the post-hoc truncation bounding procedure by throwing away out-of-bounds differentially private sanitized results from the regular Laplace mechanism; though simple, it can be more computationally expensive compared to direct sampling. Similarly, the BIT bounding procedure can also be realized post-hoc by setting out-of-bounds differentially private sanitized results from the regular Laplace mechanism at the corresponding boundaries. As the scale parameter λ → ∞ in the Laplace distribution increases either due to decrease in or increase in δ 1 , it can be easily proved that f (s i ) in the truncated Laplace mechanism in Eq. (3) converges to an uniform distribution unif(c 0i , c 1i ), and that in the BIT Laplace distribution in Eq. (4) converges to a Bernoulli distribution with probability mass at c 0i and c 1i , respectively. In both cases, the sanitized results preserve little original information. The Laplace and BIT Laplace mechanisms, as in the regular mechanism, require calculation of the l 1 -GS of s targeted for sanitization. We have obtained the l 1 GS of some common statistics, including proportion, mean, variance, and covariance. The GS of the proportion of an event in a data set, bounded in [0, 1], is n −1 , where n is the sample size of the data set; the GS of the sample mean and variance of a numerical variable in a data set of size n are (c 1 −c 0 )n −1 and (c 1 −c 0 ) 2 n −1 , respectively, where [c 0 , c 1 ] are the global bounds of the numerical attribute. The covariance between two numerical attributes bounded within [c 10 , c 11 ] × [c 20 , c 21 ] is (c 11 − c 10 )(c 21 − c 20 )n −1 . We also examined the pooled variance-covariance across multiple groups, the GS of which is somewhat complicated in expression, and also depends on how δ(x, x ) = 1 is defined. Interested readers can refer to the online supplementary materials for the GS of the components of a pooled covariance matrix. It should be noted that the GS of a function of statistic s is not equal to the function of the GS of s in general. For example, δ 1 of sample variance is (c 1 − c 0 ) 2 n −1 , but δ 1 of the sample standard deviation can not be simply calculated as (c 1 − c 0 ) 2 n −1 . In fact, the GS of the standard deviation is more difficult to calculate analytically compared to that of the variance. When the GS of a statistic s for sanitization is not easy to calculate, but a dataindependent function of s, say f (s), is, we can instead sanitize t = f (s) to obtain t * and then obtain sanitized s * via back-transformation s * = f −1 (t * ). GS in general needs to be determined analytically though it might not be a tight upper bound; numerical computation of GS is not feasible especially since it is impossible to enumerate all possible data x and all possible ways of δ(x, x ) = 1 if s is a function of continuous attributes, and it can computationally extensive even if s is a function of categorical attributes only especially when n is large.
Statistical Properties of s *
In Definition 7, the bounds [c 10 , c 11 ]×· · · [c r0 , c r1 ] need to be data invariant in order for a truncated or BIT bounding procedure to be noninformative; that is, the bounds are global and do not change with specific data x. On the other hand, a noninformative bounding procedure could have an impact on the statistical properties of sanitized results s * . In this section, we investigate the statistical behaviors of s * produced by a sanitizer with the bounding constraints. We start with defining some desired statistical properties of s * .
Definition 8. Sanitized s * is unbiased for the original result s if E(s * |s) = s. s * is asymptotically unbiased for s if E(s * |s) → s as n → ∞, where n is the sample size of original data x. s * is consistent for s if s * p − → s as n → ∞.
Both sanitizers and bounds can influence the statistical attributes of the sanitized results relative to the original results. For example, if s is boundless and sanitized via the regular Laplace mechanism, then s * would be unbiased for s since s * ∼ Lap(s, δ s −1 ) and thus E(s * ) = s. If δ s ∝ n −k , where k > 0, then s * would also be consistent for s. When s is bounded, the noninformative truncated or BIT Laplace mechanism would lead to biased s * unless the noninformative bounds are symmetric around the original s. In real life, the global bounds of s are fixed while s changes from data to data, it is very unlikely that the noninformative bounds are symmetric about s and E(s * ) = s. Proposition 9 presents the magnitude of the bias of s * relative to s in the noninformative truncated and BIT Laplace mechanisms, respectively. Proposition 10 presents a sufficient condition for s * to achieve consistency for s. The proofs of Propositions 9 and 10 are provided in Appendices A and B, respectively. 
b). The expected mean of the BIT Laplace distribution
c). µ 1 = µ 2 = s (s * is unbiased for s) if and only if c 0 + c 1 = 2s (c 0 and c 1 are symmetric around s). d). µ 1 and µ 2 are of the same sign; s * sanitized via the BIT Laplace sanitizer is no more biased than that via the truncated Laplace sanitizer (|µ 1 − s| ≤ |µ 2 − s|).
Since global bounds [c 0 , c 1 ] are unlikely to be symmetric about data-specific s, "local" bounds that depend on specific data sets can be constructed to achieve unbiasedness for s * at additional privacy cost. The data-dependent symmetric bounds are necessarily narrower than the global bounds [c 0 , c 1 ]. For example, bounds [s − min(s − c 0 , c 1 − s), s + min(s − c 0 , c 1 − s)], which is symmetric around s and the widest possible local bounds within [c 0 , c 1 ], can be used to bound sanitize results in the truncated and BIT Laplace mechanism. Since the bounds are functions of the original s, the bounding procedures will leak information about s, which has to be accounted for towards the total privacy cost. If it is difficult to quantify the actual privacy cost with the information leakage, we suggest avoiding informative bounding to opt for guaranteed -DP. Though the sanitized results might be biased for the original results with noninformative bounding, they can still enjoy desirable asymptotic properties such as asymptotic unbiasedness and consistency as n → ∞ under mild regularity conditions, as stated in Proposition 10. Proposition 10. s * sanitized via the truncated Laplace sanitizer or the BIT Laplace sanitizer is asymptotically unbiased and consistent for s if the scale parameter λ in the associated Laplace distribution approaches 0 asymptotically. The consistency of s * is critical in establishing some of the asymptotic properties of the inferences based on the sanitized data via the modips technique in Liu (2016b) . In the framework of truncated Laplace and BIT Laplace mechanisms, the scale parameter of the associate Laplace distribution λ = δ 1 −1 . With pre-specified, the only factor that links sample size n with the magnitude of λ is through δ 1 . To satisfy the condition λ → 0, δ 1 needs to → 0 as n → ∞. Intuitively speaking, as n increases, the influence of a single individual on an aggregate measure of a data set is likely to diminish, and the individual is less prone to be identified from releasing the aggregate metric; in other words, the GS of the aggregate measure decreases with n. For examples, the GS of the statistics (proportions, means, variances and covariances) presented in Section 3 and the online supplemental materials are ∝ n −1 . By Proposition 10, the sanitized results of these statistics are consistent for their original values.
Propositions 9 and 10 examine the statistical properties of sanitized statistics s * relative to their original values s. If s happen to be estimators for some parameters θ of the true distribution underlying the original data, Proposition 11 presents the conditions for s * to be unbiased, asymptotically unbiased, or consistent for θ.
Proposition 11. If s, the target statistics for sanitization, are estimators for parameters θ from a statistical model, . a) if E(s * |s) = s and E(s|θ) = θ, then E(s * |θ) = θ. b) if E(s * |s) → s, and either
Proof of Proposition 11 is given in Appendix C. Proposition 11 implies that the desired statistical properties of sanitized results relative to true parameters can be assured and executed in two steps. The first step is to choose an estimator s for θ with a desired statistical property. Both unbiased and consistent estimators are well studied in statistics so there are many easy choices for the first step. Propositions 9 and 10 list the conditions for obtaining desirable sanitized results relative to s in the second step.
simulation study 1
In the first simulation, we applied the non-informative truncated and BIT Laplace mechanisms to sanitize a 2 × 2 covariance matrix S between two variables in a data set of size n. . Though the bounds for S * 12 involved S * 11 and S * 22 , the latter two were already sanitized; therefore, S * 11 and S * 22 being used in defining bounds for S * 12 did not incur additional privacy cost. We examined sample size n ranging from 50 to 800, and three different combinations of (S 11 , S 22 , r): .5], corresponding to the 3 specifications of (S 11 , S 22 , r). The total privacy budget was set at = 1. Given that 3 statistics were sanitized on the same set of data, the sequential composition principle applied (McSherry, 2009) , and each sanitization received 1/3 of the total budget so that the total actual privacy spending over all queries was controlled at .
The results are presented in Figure 1 . The main findings are summarized as follows. First, when n was relatively small, there was noticeable deviation of the sanitized results from the original results, except for S 12 and r when r = 0 (the boundaries were symmetric about the original results and thus there was no bias per part c. of Proposition 9). Second, the sanitized results generated via the truncated Laplace mechanism were more biased than those via the BIT Laplace mechanism, consistent with part d) of Proposition 9. The bias diminished in both mechanisms as n increased. Third, as n increased, both the deviation and the dispersion of the sanitized results approached 0, consistent with Proposition 10. Lastly, the scale parameter of the associated Laplace distribution in both mechanisms was relatively large when n was small. Consequently, more sanitized results were set at the boundary values in the BIT mechanism (especially for the marginal variance and correlation), and the distribution of the sanitized results became flatter in the truncated Laplace mechanism.
simulation study 2
In the second simulation, we aimed to release proportions p = (p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , p 4 ) of four levels of a categorical variable ( 4 k=1 p k = 1). There were 4 proportions in this simulation and each proportion entry queried a disjoint subset of the data. Per the parallel composition principle (McSherry, 2009) , and the sanitization of each proportion received the total budget . We examined 3 different specifications : 0.1, 0.5 and 1. 500 multinomial original data sets, each sized at n, were simulated from multinomial(n, p = (0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4)). We examined n ranging from 50 to 500. The sample proportionsp were sanitized via the truncated and BIT Laplace mechanisms respectively, where bounds [c 0 , c 1 ] were [0, 1] and the GS was n −1 for each proportion. Since each proportion inp was sanitized independently, it was very likely that the sum of 4 raw sanitized proportions, denoted byq * k for k = 1, . . . , 4, was not equal to 1. Therefore, we normalizedq * k as in p * k =q * k ( 4 k=1q * k ) −1 and released the normalizedp * . We then calculated the bias, RMSE, both of which were relative to the true p, and CP of the 95% confidence interval (CI) of the true p nnnnnbased on the sanitizedp * and compared to those based on the original p. The CIs of the proportions were calculated using the Wilson score interval method given its good properties with extreme probabilities, which were likely especially in sanitizedp * when n or was small. The results are presented in Figure 2 and can be summarized as follows. First, there was minimal bias in the sanitizedp * when = 1 and 0.5 regardless of n and the bounding mechanism (truncated vs. BIT). There was some bias at small n when = 0.1, especially for p = 0.1 (positive bias) and p = 0.4 (negative bias). Consistent with Proposition 9, the BIT mechanism yielded less biased sanitized results than the truncated mechanism. Second, RMSE was inflated in the sanitized results compared to the original RMSE, which was expected considering the noise introduced during the sanitization step. The larger the privacy budget or the larger n was, the smaller the inflation was. The results via the BIT mechanism seemed to have larger RMSE than those from the truncated mechanism. Third, there was slight undercoverage (∼ 92%) at relatively small n when = 1. The undercoverage got worse and spanned a wider range of n as decreased (CP was around 85% ∼ 92% for n ∈ [50, ∼ 300] when = 0.5, and around 50% ∼ 80% for n ∈ [50, 300] when = 0.1). The BIT Laplace mechanism also had worse undercoverage than the truncated mechanism at small n for = 0.1. It should be noted the undercoverage in CP in some scenarios can be resolved by releasing multiple sets of sanitized results (say, 5) per original result and applying the variance combination rule given by Liu (2016b) . This is because releasing a single sanitized result does not provide sufficient information about the additional noise introduced during the sanitation process. Interested readers can refer to Liu (2016b) for more discussions on inferences based on multiple sets of sanitized results .
Discussion
We have introduced the concept of noninformative and informative bounding in the sanitization of statistics with finite bounds. We investigated the impact of informative bounding on the statistical properties of sanitized results in the context two modified Laplace mechanisms (truncated Laplace and BIT Laplace) theoretically and via empirical studies. Both the noninformative truncated and BIT Laplace mechanisms produce biased sanitized statistics relative to the original statistics unless the noninformative global bounds are symmetric around the original results, which is a hard-to-achieve condition in real life in that the original statistics change by data while the global bounds are fixed. If the scale parameter of the associated Laplace distribution, a function of l 1 -GS and prespecified privacy budget, approaches 0 as data sample size n increases, then sanitized statistics are consistent for the original statistics, as well as for some parameters if the original statistics are consistent estimators for the parameters from an assumed model on the original data. We expect that the scale parameter decreasing with n for achieving consistency is a mild regularity condition as the chance that a particular individual can be identified from releasing aggregate statistics from a data set decreases when there are more individuals in the data set. The GS of the the statistics we examined in this paper (proportions, means, variances and covariances) are all inversely proportional to n.
Though the BIT Laplace mechanism in theory delivers less biased sanitized statistics than the truncated Laplace mechanism, the former does not seem to be more advantageous over the latter in practical applications, factoring in the following considerations. First, asymptotic unbiasedness and consistency hold under the same regularity conditions in both mechanisms and there is little difference between the two when n is large. Second, the truncated Laplace distribution is a smooth distributional while the BIT Laplace distribution is discrete and comprises of 3 pieces. Though the distributional shape might be irrelevant in the release of a single sanitized result, it will have an impact when the information about the distribution of sanitized results is used, such as in the model-based differentially private synthesis (modips) approach (Liu, 2016b) . Last, the discrete 3-piece distributional shape of the BIT Laplace distribution requires the intervals of the outcomes to be closed on both ends so that the boundary values are clearly defined. This is not necessary for the truncated Laplace distribution where the density function is continuous and smooth. This last point seems trivial on paper but can be annoying in practical applications. For example, in the first simulation, closed-intervals [0, (c 1 −c 0 ) 2 n/(4(n−1))] and [−1, 1] were applied to variance and correlation, respectively. Some sanitized outputs were exactly 0 for variance, and exactly -1 or 1 for correlation from the BIT Laplace mechanism. In practice, these values are rare occurrences due to measurement errors and noises, and data users may choose not to accept the sanitized outcomes at all. If the data users demand more plausible results that agree with real-life situations, the decision of using what values to replace the implausible boundary values (0, -1, 1) becomes arbitrary and could also potentially affects the statistical properties of the sanitize results. Those concerns do not exist in the truncated Laplace mechanism. This paper has focused on the applications of the truncated and BIT truncated bounding procedures in the framework of the Laplace mechanisms. Other differentially private sanitizers with unbounded numerical supports, such as the higher-ordered GGM, can also employ the truncated and BIT truncated bounding procedures when sanitizing bounded results. How these two bounding procedures affect the utility of the sanitized results from these sanitizers are possibly vary case by case.
of µ 1 , we have shown in Part c) that f (x) = (|x| + λ) exp(−|x|/λ) is symmetric and monotonically decreasing with |x|; therefore, f (s − c 0 ) > f (c 1 − s) and the numerator in Eq. (5) 
B Proof of Proposition 10
To show the consistency of s * for s, we apply the Chebyshev's inequality by showing E(s * −s) 2 → 0 or E(s * 2 )−(E(s * )) 2 → 0 as n → ∞. In the truncated Laplace mechanism, Let s * denote a random draw from the truncated Laplace distribution with location parameter s and scale parameter λ . Eq (B.1) suggests E(s * 2 ) → s 2 as λ → 0. Since E(s * ) → s (Eq (5)), thus (E(s * )) 2 → s 2 as λ → 0. Taken together, as λ → 0, E(s * 2 ) − (E(s * )) 2 → 0. Since λ ∝ n k , where k < 0, then as n → ∞, s * p − → s, or s * is consistent for s. In the BIT Laplace mechanism, E(s * ) = p 0 c 2 0 + p 1 c 2 1 + (1 − p 0 − p 1 )E(s * 2 |s * ∈ [c 0 , c 1 ]), where p 0 = F (c 0 ) = , which → s 2 as λ → 0. Since E(s * ) → s (Eq (6)), thus (E(s * )) 2 → s 2 as λ → 0. Taken together, as λ → 0, E(s * 2 ) − (E(s * )) 2 → 0. Since λ ∝ n k , where k < 0, then as n → ∞, s * p − → s, or s * is consistent for s.
